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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4686 
___________ 
 
ONOFRIO POSITANO, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA CARDIOTHORACIC SURGERY, INC.;  
MICHAEL D. HAROSTOCK, M.D. INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL.;  
WILKES-BARRE GENERAL HOSPITAL, INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-01521) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on April 30, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed May 11, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Onofrio Positano appeals pro se from the judgment entered against him in a civil 
rights action.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.   
I. 
 Positano is an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Facility at 
Mahanoy.  In May 2013, he brought this action in District Court against the defendants, 
Wilkes-Barre General Hospital (WGBH), Pennsylvania Cardiothoracic Surgery, Inc. 
(PCS), and Dr. Michael Harstock, a PCS employee.  Positano claimed that the defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs concerning his quadruple bypass 
surgery, which Harstock performed at WGBH in June 2011.  Positano’s amended 
complaint raised both Eighth Amendment and state-law claims.  Specifically, he claimed 
that substandard treatment and aftercare by Harstock resulted in complications and 
necessitated a second surgery to repair Positano’s sternum.  Additional surgery, he 
alleged, will be required to relieve his ongoing pain and other symptoms.  He further 
claimed that he was not seen by Harstock for three or four months after he complained to 
a prison doctor on October 5, 2011, about severe chest pain and physical deformity 
around the surgical site. 
 In March 2014, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint on 
several grounds, including Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On December 2, 2014, the District 
dismissed Positano’s constitutional claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise 
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supplemental jurisdiction over Positano’s state-law claims.1  Positano timely appealed.  
He also filed an “argument in support of appeal” and requested counsel. 
II. 
      We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s rulings is plenary except for the dismissal of the state-law claims, which we 
review for abuse of discretion.  Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 
1990).  Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the pleader has not alleged 
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal 
does not present a substantial question.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d 
Cir.2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
 To state a viable Eighth Amendment claim, Positano needed to allege facts 
plausibly suggesting that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical 
need.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976).2  “To act with deliberate 
                                              
1 Positano had filed civil medical malpractice actions, based on essentially identical 
claims, in state court prior to bringing this action in the District Court.  The District Court 
noted, however, that Positano terminated his state court claims before the District Court 
issued its opinion. 
 
2 In their motions to dismiss, the defendants argued that Positano’s claim could not 
survive both because he failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim and because they are 
not state actors.  Although the District Court did not rely on the latter ground for its 
decision, Positano argues on appeal that it improperly considered an affidavit by 
WGBH’s Director of Patient Safety Services which was attached to WGBH’s motion to 
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indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of 
serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009).  In order to be liable 
for deliberate indifference, a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 
draw the inference.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  A plaintiff may 
show deliberate indifference by establishing that the defendants “intentionally den[ied] or 
delay[ed] access to medical care.”  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.  However, “[w]here a 
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the 
treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and 
to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. 
Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 Here, Positano has not alleged any facts to support a finding that the defendants 
had cause to know of any serious medical condition beyond that for which he was already 
                                                                                                                                                  
dismiss.  Courts may consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant 
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the 
attached document.”  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  Here, the affidavit expressly denied a contractual relationship 
between the prison and WGBH, an essential element of demonstrating § 1983 liability.  
The District Court was therefore correct to consider the document.  In any event, the 
District Court’s opinion explicitly stated that it did not rely on whether the defendants 
were state actors due in part to Positano’s claim that he possessed copies of contracts 
between the defendants and the prison.  Positano did not submit the contracts to the 
District Court, but he stated that he would supply them in camera if required.  Given the 
possible dispute over whether the defendants have a contractual relationship with the 
5 
 
receiving treatment.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.  Positano has not claimed that 
Harstock, PCS, or WGBH were involved in the events of October 5, 2011, or that they 
knew he was experiencing pain at that time.  See Farmer, 511 at 837.  Instead, Positano’s 
own complaint suggested that Harstock first learned of Positano’s condition during the 
follow-up exam.  After that exam, Harstock scheduled another appointment in six 
months, while instructing Positano to alert him if the pain worsened in the meantime.  
After the second appointment, Harstock performed another surgery to repair Positano’s 
sternum.  At no point did Positano allege that his pain increased in between his first and 
second appointments or that he made any requests for interim treatment.  In fact, Positano 
stated that he remained under Harstock’s care for his continuing pain and would likely 
undergo a third surgery to relieve his symptoms.  Given all this, we agree with the 
District Court that Positano did not plausibly allege that any of the named defendants 
intentionally delayed or denied his medical care.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.   
 Furthermore, we note, malpractice does not establish deliberate indifference for 
Eighth Amendment purposes.  See id., 429 U.S. at 104-06.  Positano’s own pleadings 
indicated that Harstock provided him with a level of medical care sufficient to defeat an 
Eighth Amendment claim.  See United States ex rel. Walker, 599 F.2d at 575 n.2.  
Because he repeatedly challenges the quality of care that he received, Positano’s claims 
sound instead in negligence or malpractice.  See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d 
                                                                                                                                                  
prison, the District Court decided the action – as we do – based on Positano’s failure to 
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).   
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Cir. 1999).  “[M]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to 
state a constitutional violation.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted).  For these reasons, we agree with the District 
Court that Positano did not state a viable Eighth Amendment claim.3  
IV. 
 For the reasons given, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 4  Positano’s motion for the appointment of counsel is denied. 
                                              
3 Regarding Positano’s state-law tort claims, we note that, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a [state law] claim . . . if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
original jurisdiction.”  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Albert 
Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984).  As Positano has not claimed 
any exceptional circumstances warranting supplemental jurisdiction, we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing these claims. 
 
4 In response to Positano’s request, the District Court gave him an opportunity to amend 
his original complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The amended complaint did not correct the deficiencies identified by the District 
Court.  In these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court need not have 
extended further leave to amend.  See Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 134 (3d Cir. 
2005).  
